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THE EQillVALENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND
DISTRIBUTED MONTE CARLO LEARNING
Yuya Sasaki

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a tight relationship between evolutionary game
theory and distributed intelligence models. After reviewing some existing theories
of replicator dynamics and distributed Monte Carlo learning, we make
fonnulations and proofs of the equivalence between these two models. The
relationship will be revealed not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but also by
experimental simulations of the models by taking a simple symmetric zero-sum
game as an example. As a consequence, it will be verified that seemingly chaotic
macro dynamics generated by distributed micro-decisions can be explained with
theoretical models.
JEL classifications: C73, C63
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THE EQUIVALENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND
DISTRIBUTED MONTE CARLO LEARNING

1 Introduction: Significance of the Topic

Evolutionary game theory and computational economics 1 are two ofthe latest
fields to account for evolutionary processes of economics. When it comes to a
problem of aggregate behavior, the former seems to have a limited ability to
incorporate micro behaviors of each economic agent, while the latter often fails
in formalizing the processes. Indeed, computational simulation practitioners
empirically know that a collection of rule-based or learnable autonomous agents
usually leads to an emergent outcome that partially agrees with the theoretically
expected one, but the process by which distributed intelligence translates to such
an outcome has been seldom understood (the difficulty of rigorous analyses is
stated by Maes (1995)). However, the field also exhibits flexibilities which can
be associated with existing theories of dynamics.
In this paper, we present the equivalence between the prototype theory of
deterministic evolutionary games and the computational model of distributedagent Monte Carlo learning. Monte Carlo learning was selected mainly for two
reasons. First, it lays a foundation for many of the other learning algorithms,

1Computational economics varies in its sub-fields. For example, there are (i)
numerical dynamics, (ii) numerical optimization, (iii) heuristic optimization, and
(iv) bottom-up processes by autonomous entities, etc. In this paper, we will
narrow-sightedly refer to only (iv) as "computational economics."

2
especially Q-Iearning and Sarsa algorithms (Barto and Singh, 1990; Sutton and
Barto, 1998). Second, unlike evolutionary algorithms, its simple form makes it
easier to extend the algorithm to be associated with economic theory. Before
discussing the main ideas, let us identify the relative roles and the historical
background of evolutionary game theory, computational distributed-agent models,
and learning.
Several methodologies have been developed to explain aggregate behaviors
of multiple economic agents where strategic decision-making is involved.
Normal-form theoretical models have played a basic role. While bearing out the
theory of games von Neumann devoted himself to the development of selfreproductive machines and cellular automata (von Neumann, 1966), that later was
to produce what is called artificial life or ALife (Langton, 1989). Artificial life has
in turn motivated computer-based experimental scientists to model games of
complex systems that generate emergent dynamics. However, few researchers
have made attempts to merge these two distant fields of von Neumann's legacy.2
While some economists were acquiring a new model of games which stem
from the initial developments by Maynard Smith (1974), biologists had started to
employ computational and individual-based models (ruMs) to examine bottom-up

2Some early 1990s' pioneering works (e.g., Holland and Miller (1991);
Arthur (1993)) have attempted to merge economic theory and autonomous
intelligence models. Judd (1997) and Judd (2001) discuss the potential roles of
computational economics in emerging economic theory.

3

behaviors of ecological dynamics (e.g., Dewdney, 1984). Today, the contributions
of IBMs are not restricted to applied problems, but include theoretical problems
in population and community ecology (Haefner, 1996). On the other hand, the
theoretical dynamics model of deterministic evolutionary games, or replicator
dynamics (Taylor and Johnker, 1978; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983),3 was shown
by Hofbauer (1981) to be equivalent to an ecological dynamics model, namely the
Lotka-Volterra equation. This sequence of events suggests the possibility of
merging IBMs into the formulations of deterministic evolutionary games.
While the deterministic evolutionary games were becoming obsolete for
game theorists, they certainly absorbed economists in the 1990s (Friedman
(1991); and for stochastic version later by Kandori et al. (1993)). Unlike the
passive being of chromosomes in biological systems, economic agents exhibit
active characteristics (ie. learning). It was therefore a natural course for
economists to turn their attention to this dynamic aspect (e.g., Roth and Erev,
1995; Dosi, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, etc.).
Computational experiments as well as psychological laboratory experiments
complement theory in this aspect. One way to demonstrate how to use
computational experiments in learning is to employ agent-based simulations or

3Extensions and analyses of the replicator dynamics, multi-agent dynamics,
and other derivatives were made by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988; 1998; 2003),
Cressman (1992), Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Swinkels (1993), Weibull
(1997), etc.
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agent-based models (ABMs; also called agent-based computational economics or
ACE), a sub-field of computational economics (for an overview, see Tesfatsion,
2002).
ABMs in economics are the analogues ofIBMs in biology. In ABMs, some
other forms of learnable functions (e.g., Monte Carlo sampling, statistical
learning, reinforcement learning, neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, etc.)
are embedded in each economic agent, and the agents behave autonomously by
querying their internal function for the optimal actions or strategies given the
current state of the world. Hence, ABMs conduct the process of strategy
optimization at a micro level. ABMs are usually employed to explain the
sophisticated bottom-up processes of evolutionary economics, which would be
infeasible with top-down theoretical models (Tesfatsion, 2000). While it appears
that the principles of ABMs researchers and those of game theorists have diverged
more than converged, the concept of the replicator dynamics roughly agrees with
simple learnable ABMs, as will be shown in later sections.
In this paper we begin by briefly reviewing the basis of existing theories of
deterministic evolutionary games and the algorithm of distributed Monte Carlo
learning (Sec. 2). Then, our discussion moves on to formulations and proofs of the
equivalence of evolutionary game theory and multiagent Monte Carlo learning
(Sec. 3). Our method does not rely on the field's convention of using the
hypothetico-deductive approach, but will instead start with the somewhat

5

farfetched connection of the two models' formulations. In Sec. 4, experimental
results of ABMs will be compared to the theoretical dynamics model to
graphically verify their common behavioral patterns. The end product is the
theoretical and experimental verifications of the relationship between these two
models. This will also enable some explanations about how micro behaviors
translate to macro dynamics.

2 Background of Theory and Algorithm
We begin with some definitions and a description of the tools to be used for
the succeeding analyses. Assume that the number of participating agents in
the game world is finite and fixed. Assume also that the number of strategies
or actions that these agents can take is finite and fixed. Let n denote the total
number of available strategies, and let

Xi

denote the relative frequency of

agents that take strategy i, such that I:~=o Xi
(Xl, X2, ... ,Xn )

= 1, Xi

~ OVi. Note that x

=

represents the distribution vector 4 of strategy frequencies,

whereas x in a normal-form game would represent the distribution vector
of strategy probabilities. Let

rn denote the subset of R+

{x E R+ I I:~=l Xi = 1, x ~ O}. Point x can move only on

defined as

rn =

rn, the strategy

space. The aggregate pure states are represented by the vertices of r n , and
the aggregate mixed states by all the points off the vertices. The core rule
of the game is determined by a payoff matrix Anxn = (aij), where aij or,
eiAej, is the payoff for taking pure strategy i when all the agents in the
4

The vector notation used throughout this paper ignores the row/column dis-

tinctions. Thus, xAx means x TAx.
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game world would take pure strategy j. In general, the payoff for taking pure
strategy i is given by ei Ax. Additionally, xAx gives the average payoff to
agents in the game world, since x is the distribution of frequencies. At an
individual level , the task of strategy optimization is to choose the strategy i
such that i

= arg maxk ekAx. This strategy will surely be a pure strategy for

the individuals , meaning that the optimal strategy for an individual cannot
occur in intrn. Given this , let us define the individuals ' (pure) strategy set
P

= {i

E N1

I ei Ern}. However, the Nash equilibrium and stable points

may occur at x E intrn in the "aggregate" level. By definition, the Nash
equilibrium is the state x* where

x * Ax* ~ xAx*

Vx

Ern.

(1)

All these definitions are consistent with those of normal-form games , except
that frequency is substituted for probabilities.

2.1 A brief review of prototype deterministic evolutionary games

It is usually feasible to analyze local behaviors of dynamics even without

complete solutions, as we may identify the w-limit (a-limit) of a dynamics
if the stability (unstability) exists around the equilibrium. An important
concept used in evolutionary games is the evolutionarily stable state (ESS)
By definition, the necessary and sufficient condition for the state x* to be
5

In evolutionary games and its derivatives, it is at the aggregate level that a

state (rather than strategy) can be mixed.

7
the ESS is for the inequality

(2)

x*Ax> xAx

to hold for all x

=1=

x* in the neighborhood of x* in

is to be intruded by a state x

=1=

rn.

When an ESS, x*,

x* with meta-frequency E, the inequality

EX* Ax + (1 - E)X* Ax* > ExAx + (1 - E)xAx*

must be satisfied for x* to dominate the intruder x. By rewriting this, we
find
(1 - E) [x* Ax* - xAx*]

In the limit as

E

+ E[x* Ax -

xAx] > O.

(3)

approaches zero, (3) becomes equivalent to inequality (1),

the definition of the Nash equilibrium. In a special case of the Nash equilibrium where x* Ax*

= xAx* for some x

=1=

x*, (3) becomes equivalent to in-

equality (2), which is the definition of the ESS. Intuitively, if some frequency
distribution other than the Nash equilibrium's frequency distribution is as
optimal on the equilibrium, then the Nash equilibrium's frequency distribution must be superior to the other distribution on all the neighborhood
points so that the state will be brought back to the equilibrium.
To allow this model to involve dynamics, evolutionary game theorists
often employ the replicator equation (Taylor and Johnker, 1978; Schuster
and Sigmund, 1983). The rate of growth (or of adoption) of a certain strategy
is defined by the relative optimality of the performance of strategy i, namely
the payoff for taking pure strategy i minus the mean payoff in the game

8
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world. Hence, it is expressed as

(log Xi) = eiAx - xAx,

(4)

or equivalently,

(5)
This represents the standard form of the replicator equation when the payoff
function is linear with matrix A. From (4), we get

Thus,

(6)
provided

Xj

=1=

O. In the equilibrium, the ratio of a strategy's frequency to

the other's frequency stays constant, or the time differential of the ratio is
zero. So (6) indicates that x will be an equilibrium in intrn if and only if
it satisfies

(7)
The concepts presented so far concerns the dynamics in continuous time.
Dekel and Scotchmer (1992) and Cabrales and Sobel (1992) present the
versions for discrete time. The formula

(8)
can be considered as the least objectionable candidate for the replicator

e is selected so that eiAxt + e will
our interpretation of e will be rather different,

equation in discrete time. A constant
always be positive. Yet,

9
as will be discussed later (see Theorem 2). This discrete version of the
replicator equation does not convey all the properties of the continuous
version. Like the case where we compute ordinary differential equations
using the Euler's method, periodic cycles which would be observed in (5) will
be lost and the trajectories will converge to bdr n when (8) is substituted
for (5). However, (8) plays an important role when the theory discussed in
this section is associated with ABMs involving Monte Carlo learning. The
main reason is that ABMs intrinsically assume discrete time.

2.2 Agent-based models with Monte Carlo learning

Computational economics that uses ABMs has borrowed an idea from artificial intelligence, in that an agent perceives the state of the world, processes
the information using internal functions, and returns a strategy - "action" is
the term in AI - that optimizes the current and/or delayed payoff to himself
(most general AI textbooks start with this concept, ego Russell and Norvig,
1995). The algorithms for agents' internal functions vary. It could be simple condition-action rules, network-based regressions, statistical learning,
or evolutionary algorithms. In our study, Monte Carlo learning is analyzed
because of its strong relationship with the theory discussed in the previous
section. When multiple agents are put in the game world, an agent's interaction with the world implicitly means his interaction with other agents.
This logic justifies the use of ABMs for experimentations of games.

10
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An agent could choose the optimal strategy, i, for the next time step
such that

where pdf(·) is probability density function. However, the problem here is
that he may not have perfect information of pdf (xt+l ) for all xt+l E

rn,

which he would roughly learn from life experiences. In our model, a simple
AI is used for agents to learn directly the mapping of strategy-state pairs
into expected payoff set 6 in the following way. Let

rn}
v=

be the set of (n

+ 1)-tupple

n = {( i, xt)

liE P, xt E

parameters of strategy-state pairs, and

{Vt+l E Rl } be the set such that vt+l is the prediction of the value of

eiAxt+l . Generally, an agent's internal function will be given in the form

F :

n ---+ v.

(9)

This can be considered as prediction, since the agent expects that strategy i
will cause the next period's payoff of e iAxt+l to turn out , having observed
xt in the current period. Alternatively, a recency-weighted observation of

(I-A)

2::!=1 At-k-1xk may be substituted for xt of n in (9). While this sort

of function is often realized by regression models or neural networks, let us
adopt a discretized state model (tabular state space) for simplicity. Suppose
that rn is separated into non-overlapping subsets such that

Uzrr = rn and

rr n r~ = 0 for all m =1= l, which obviously implies rr c rnVl. Preferably,
6

It is sound to believe that real human agents learn the direct mapping rather

than probability. In Bayesian updating, learning for probability rather than direct
mapping is concerned.
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each

rr should have equal size. Define the new set t2 = {(i, l) liE P, rr c

rn}, and with a discrete indexing by l, (9) can be rewritten as

P: t2

~

v.

(10)

This function exhibits a minor weakness, in that all the states x belonging
to category l are considered identical. However, it has an advantage when
learning occurs from sampling. Given the function, agents will take strategy i

= argmaxk P(k, l). Occasional explorations of not taking the optimal

strategies are also important, for the reason that agents have to experience all the i-l combinations so that they enable

P to be effective for most

situations, if not all.
Learning, in this context, refers to the process of modifying function (10)
so that it will return more and more accurate prediction values. To make
writing simple, let

Vi,l

= P( i, l) denote the predicted value returned by the

function P( i, l). That is, if the learning is fast enough (and if the equilibrium
is not very unstable), we expect that
for xt E

Vi ,l

eventually converges to e iAxt+l

rr in the limit as t approaches positive infinity. To introduce Monte

Carlo learning, assume for the moment that an agent always perceives land
takes strategy i. With this assumption, the estimated value of Vi,l at time t
by average of samples is
t

Vf,l

=

L ei Axk It.
k=l

This is straightforward, yet the agent may run up his memory in this case,
ie. he has to memorize all the payoffs in the past t time steps. An alternative

Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning
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learning rule equivalent to the above one is
(11)
Now, the agent needs to memorize only two terms for learning. (11) executes
equally weighted averaging of all the past payoffs. This algorithm works
well if the world is deterministic in that the transition from xt to xt+l is
guaranteed. However, the learning with (11) will be always obsolete if the
world is stochastic. To make (11) a recency-weighted learning, we substitute
a constant a E (0,1) for lit in (11) so we have
t

Vi l

,

= a [A
e i x t - Vit-l]
l
+ Vit-l
l .
"

(12)

The larger the value of a, the more recency-weighted is learning. This is
evidenced by the following logic:
t

v·1., l

= a [A
ei x t - v·1.,t-l]
l
+ v·1.,t-l
l
= aeiAxt + (1 - a)aeiAxt-l + (1 - a)2aeiAxt-2 + ...
t

~

L a(l -

u
a)t-ueiAx .

u=l

This parameter for the degree of recency-weighting, a, may be associated
with what Roth and Erev (1995) would refer to as the degree of "forgetting,"
though their views might be slightly different. Besides, it also accounts for
what Friedman (1998) refered to as "inertia" which is one of the most significant properties of evolutionary games. From another viewpoint, a works
as the parameter to control the behaviors observed in macro dynamics, as
will be discussed later. Conversely, we may calibrate a by the backward
computation from the data of an observed macro dynamics.

13
It is unrealistic to assume that an agent always perceives l and takes
strategy i. Unlike (11), recency-weighted learning (12) relaxes this assumption. Thus, it is safe to apply the general game representations to the
recency-weighted Monte Carlo learning. In summary, an agent queries his
function if for the expected payoff of taking strategy i in state l, and chooses
such i that maximizes V!,l' which is his estimate of eiAxt+1. At the same
time, he modifies if by using (12) so that it will return more accurate values
in the future.

3 Connecting multi-agent Monte Carlo learning to the replicator
equation

In the previous section, agents ' learning was formalized at an individual
level. We need a slight modification of the model in order to extend the algorithm to the analyses of aggregate behaviors. With the assumption that
one-step transition among

rf, rr , ...

makes small differences, the negative

effects from eliminating our distinction of

vL by l will be offset by the in-

troduction of distribution-based notation of vf.

Definition 1.

We define the estimated payoff of strategy i E P weighted

by its frequency as the total value estimate of strategy i. Let

v!

denote the

total value of vf , which is the estimate of the total value of eiAx, namely

(The following describes the rationale for employing the total value estimates for the aggregate model. It is only among that frequency of popula-

14

Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning

tion,

xr, that strategy i is "believed" to be the maximizer of eiAxt. Hence,

the population of at least and at most this frequency (xD will encounter
the payoff of eiAxt and update the function P of (10) with the error given
by eiAxt -

vf

for each agent. Hence, the aggregate error of this population
-t

can be defined as XHeiAxt - ~l

(= x~eiAxt - vf)·) With the individual

Monte Carlo learning (12) being modified for the total value estimate, the
aggregate Monte Carlo learning can be defined as

(13)
For these definitions of aggregated Monte Carlo learning, we put the following sound assumptions:
Assumption 1:
Assumption 2:

The first assumption states that the strategy that causes the least payoff will
attract less than the average frequency. The second assumption states that
the total value estimate of the smallest payoff is less than the average of total
value estimates. Now, let variable 8(yt) as a function of yt =

(vi, v~, ... ,v;)

denote some value that is related to the distribution of yt. With this definition, the following formula can be hypothesized as an estimate of state
transition for the aggregate behavior of Monte Carlo agents.

(14)
The endogenous variable 8(yt) must satisfy the condition that v;+l
be positive for all i.

+ 8(yt)

15

Given the definition of the aggregate recency-weighted Monte Carlo
learning (13) , the hypothesized rule (14) will transform as follows.
X~+l
t

+
2:: j (VJ+l + 8(yt))
axr . eiAxt + (1

V~+l
8(yt)
'= __~t~~~~_ _
•

- a)vr

+ 8(vt)

(15)

Let us define eji and 'ljJt as

¢/ = (1 - a)vr
t

'IjJ

=

+ 8(yt)

and

axr
2:: j (1 - a)v; + n8(yt)
a

,

(16)

thus enabling (15) to be written in the simple form

(17)

The update rule (17) thus resembles the discrete replicator equation (8).
Lemma 1 (8) and (17) (and thus (14)) are equivalent if and only if ej}

=

e for eji and 'ljJt in (17), and the sufficiency is obvious.
Necessity by contrapositive: if e =1= ¢/ Ve =1= 'ljJt, then (8) and (17) cannot
Proof Substitute

be equivalent .

0

Since (8) is (merely) suggested as a candidate (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998), (17) would still represent the discrete replicator equation even if

eji

=1=

'ljJt as long as appropriate normalization is executed on xt+l. Yet, our

16
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study sticks to the case where

qi

equals 'l/J t . By equating

q}

to 'l/J t in (16),

we get the endogenous variable
(18)
For (17) to be equivalent to (8), this equation of the endogenous variable
(18) must be equal for a given t for all i.

Lemma 2 The endogenous variable (18) for a given t is equal for all i

E

P

in the game.

In order to prove this lemma, consider two cases: (a) x is an equilibrium at
the center of

rn; and (b) other cases. (case (b) covers (a) as well.)

Proof - Case (a): x is an equilibrium at the center of

rn

If the frequency distribution is an equilibrium, eiAx = ejAx (= c) holds

from (7), where we use c to denote the corresponding value. With the definition of the aggregate recency-weighted Monte Carlo learning (13), this
translates to vI - (1 - a)v;-l
be rewritten as

= aXiC for all

i. Using this equation, (18) can

17

Since limt--+oo (1 - a)t+l

= 0, this eventually can be simplified to
(19)

For the case where x is at the center of

r

n

,

we have

=

Xi

Xj

(= ~) for

all i and j. The endogenous variable 8(vt) turns out to be independent of
strategy if x is an equilibrium at the center of intrn.

D

From (14) in conjugate with (18) and (19), any underestimated total values
of payoff on average (vf

Vi) cannot fall short of eiA x(1 - a)/n.

Proof - Case (b) : other cases

First, define f3ij such that

vj = vf . f3ij

for all i and j. Obviously, f3ij equals

f3;/. Then, (18) can be written as

Variable 8(vt) is equal for all the n strategies if and only if
(20)
for all i and k. By the way, the next two equations are true from our definitions.

vf

Ej

f3kj

vk

Ej

f3ij

and

L X~ = 1.

(21)

One way to ensure our argument is to show that (21) is sufficient for (20). We
will show this only for the case of n

vi(1 -

= 2. Since we have (21) or l - xt - x~ = 0,

xi - x~) = v~(1 - xi - x~) = 0

or

18
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vf(1

+ xi

- 2xi - x~) = v~(1

+ x~

- xi - 2x~)

+ x~(vi + v~) vi + v~
v~ + x~(vi + v~) vi + v~
v~

vi

Now, in order to eliminate

or

2v~x~

or

nv~x~

(22)

and v~ from (22), we use the following equa-

tions derived from our definition.
and similarly,

Given this, (22) can be rewritten as
1 + x~(2=j ,8lj - n)

1 + xi(2:=j ,82j - n)

2:=j ,8lj

2:=j ,82j

(2::: ,82j) (1 -

x~ - xi

j

2::: ,8lj) = (2::: ,8lj)(1 j

j

xi - x~

2::: ,82j)

j

j

j

or

or

j

j

j

j

1 - x~ 2:=j ,82j

1- xin

1 - xi 2:=j ,8lj

1-

x~n·

By relating (21) and the above equation, we get

which exhibits exactly the same form as (20).
Since

0

e has the domain (- mini eiAxt, 00), we can have q} = 'lj;t = e if

and only if the proposition of the following lemma is true.

19

specified in Table 1.

Proof Since the implication of Lemma 2 is

qi =

for this proof, and we only need to show e iAxt
that e iAxt

+ q/ >

argminj ejAxt

0 Vi {::::::::} mini e iAxt

+ qi.

+ qi >

'ljJt Vi, we can use (18)

+ q/ >

0 Vi. It is clear

O. Let subscript i denote

By substituting (18), the value of

qi

in (16) will be

The addition of e iAxt to the above equation yields

ae~ + (1 - a)¢~
a(1 - x~n)
where ~

= (1 - x;n )eiAxt and ¢; = 2: j vj - nvf. By Assumption 1, the

denominator is positive, implying the equivalence between the positivity of
eiAxt
e~%O

+ qi

¢:}

and that of ae~

+ (1- a)¢~

(numerator). Besides, this tells that

e~Axt%O. Similarly, by Assumption 2, ¢t

(A) when e iAxt > 0: Since ae~

+ (1

-

> 0 holds.

a)¢; is a convex set in

Rl with e~

satisfies the first column of Table 1.

(B) when e iAxt :::; 0 and a is relatively low: The inequality ae;+(I-a)¢; >

o is equivalent to a < (M~e~' Thus, all a < ¢~~e~
greater than 0) will satisfy e iAxt

+ qi > 0 for

to the first row - second column of Table 1.

(that are relatively low, but
the condition corresponding

20
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mini eiAx t

a

>0

::;0

relatively low

Yes

Yes

relatively high

Yes

Yes/No

Table 1 The conditions in which Lemma 3 and Theorem 1 do and do not hold.

(C) when eiAxt ::; 0 and a is relatively high: From (B), all a ::;
to satisfy eiAxt

+ ¢/ > o.

If

¢~~e~

¢~~e~

fail

::; 1, we have "No" for the second row -

second column of Table 1. However, if

¢!~e!

is greater than one or is outside

of the domain of a, then we have "Yes" for all the entries of Table 1.

0

Finally, we arrive at the following theorem, which is the main claim of this
paper.
Theorem 1 The discrete replicator equation (8) and the aggregate model

of distributed Monte Carlo learning (14) are equivalent for those conditions
specified in Table 1.

Proof Since

e in (8) is the parameter to be freely selected in (- mini eiAxt, 00),

implies eji = 'lj;t Vi. Given this and Lemma 3, there exists some value of
such that (pt

= 'lj;t =

e>

e

- mini eiAxt for those conditions specified in

Table 1. Hence, from Lemma 1, we conclude the truth of the proposition of
Theorem 1.

0

Equation (14) with the endogenous variable defined in (18) represents the
aggregate Monte Carlo rule that is equivalent to the discrete replicator
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equation (8) for those conditions specified in Table 1. Equation (14) may
be considered as the medium of the agent based models and the replicator equation that , we expect , will give rise to a formal process in which
computational and theoretical models will be fused. Surely, it relies on the
assumptions made at the beginning of this section.

4 Experiments: how aggregate fluctuations are related to the
degree of individuals' recency-weighting

Having seen the theoretical aspect of the relationship between the two models, one might be tempted to observe and compare the simulation results
of them. Let us take a simple zero-sum game as an example. The payoff
matrix is defined as

A=

o

1

-1

-1

0

1

1

-1

0

(23)

In this case, it is concluded from (4) that

(log Xl)

+ (lOgX2) + (logX3) = 0
d
dt (log XIX2 X 3)

or

= 0 or
(24)

Hence, the trajectories draw periodic cycles around the equilibrium point
in intr 3 with

XIX2X3

being a constant of motion. Fig. 1 (a) depicts typical

motions of periodic cycle in intr 3 . If we assume continuous time, equation
(5) can be used to simulate the dynamics of (23). An experiment with the
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(b)

(a)

Continuous Replicator Dynamics (Runge-Kutta)

[::j \\u':-V\\u·.' \ F:
OJ

0.3

.

~

.

,

0.2

I

',- ./'

_/'

10.0

time (1 step

2000
=

0.01 t)

Fig. 1 (a) Trajectories of periodic cycles where the game is a special case of zerosum game. (b) A result of simulation using the continuous replicator equation
with fourth-order Runge Kutta method.

fourth-order Runge-Kutta method gives a result illustrated by Fig. 1 (b).
Clearly, it follows a periodic cycle that agrees with (24) and Fig. 1 (a).
However, as briefly mentioned earlier, the assumption of discrete time
makes the consequences quite different. Let us assume that the parameter
~

is sufficiently large such that eiAx be positive for all i. Note that xAx is

always zero for (23). The Nash equilibrium (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is not the ESS
since x* Ax - xAx

= 0 (see (2)). Now, let us define the function
3

V(x)

=

II x~:,
i=l

and we have
.

V =
V

3

.

Lx*X

i

i=l

t

t'

X·

(25)

While equation (25) assumes continuous time, we can approximate the value
of Xi for the discrete version (8) by using the leapfrog method, as
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1

=

t eiAxt
2[xi xt Axt

+

e

+ ~t

x~ eiAxt

e-

1
t x t - 1Ax t - 1 +
- Xi eiAxt-1 + ~t-l 1
eiAxt-1

= 2[---zt + ei Axt - 1 +

e- 11 .

Substitute this in (25), and we get

Since

it turns out that

v

V < 0,

Function V is a negative gradient-like Lyapunov function. Thus, all nonequilibrium states in intr3 will converge to bdr 3 . However, this may not
be the case when

e takes a large value, since we have
lim

~---->oo

For a reasonably large value of

e,

V = o.

(26)

the discrete replicator dynamics will

behave like the continuous version. Additionally, we find

d

V

d~t-l (V)

1

=

3

-"6 ~

>0

ei Axt - 1
(ei Axt - 1 +

v~t-l

~t-l )2

>-

m~n eiAxt- 1,

x =1= x*.

t

Since

VIV <

gradients.

0, this means that the larger values of

e will lead to flatter
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Discrete Replicator Dynamics
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Discrete Replicator Dynamics
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time (1 step

2000
=
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Fig. 2 Results of simulation using the discrete replicator equation (a) for
5.0, and (b) for

e=

e = 25.0.

Fig. 2 (a) is a result of (23) with the discrete replicator equation (8)
for ~t

= 5.0, and Fig. 2 (b) for

e = 25.0. States gradually converge to the

r3,

and the period of cycles becomes longer as time

passes. Smaller value of

e causes more rapid convergence. More formally,

boundary subset of

we arrive at the following theorem.

Theorem 2

The parameter

e

of the discrete replicator equation (8) is

likely to be inversely related with the degree of agents ' recency-weighting,

Q.
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Proof We ideally need the assumption that the total value estimates are not
affected by a , as if they were exogenous (Appendix B presents the difficulty
without this assumption; however, this assumption is valid for many cases,
as presented in Appendix B). Then, from (16) , we have

ael}

aa = - xHv;
~

+ b(yt)]/(axD2

-XHV;+1

+ b(yt)]/(ax;)2 < 0,

and similarly

Since Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 hold, we are likely to have ae / aa < 0 too.
D

Intuitively, smaller

e causes

agents to respond more sensitively to the

current state (obvious from (8)) , and agents with greater degree of recencyweighting, a, behave in a similar way. Theorem 2 in conjugate with

V<0

and d~t (~) > 0 for the special case of (23) implies that a group of more
recency-weighting agents tends to generate rapid growth of wave amplitude,
which is graphically evidenced by Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. This makes sense also
from the following example. Assume that the states {x I Xl
continue for some duration (eg. t
V3

>

VI

>

V2

> X2

~

X3}

= 100 to 110). At t = 111, the ordering of

will prevail among most (if not all) agents if they put heavy

weights on the recent experiences due to (12). On the other hand, less
recency-weighting agents do not necessarily make such temporarily biased
ordering depending on what experiences they had from t

= 0 to 99. In this
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(a)

Agent-Based Monte Carlo Dynamics
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Agent-Based Monte Carlo Dynamics
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Agent-Based Monte Carlo Dynamics
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Fig. 3 Results of simulation using multi-agent Monte Carlo learning (a) for more
recency-weighting parameter (ex
(ex

=

= 0.5),

(b) for less recency-weighting parameter

0.1), and (c) for the least recency-weighting parameter (ex

=

0.00001).
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case, a group of more recency-weighting agents tends to lean toward e3 more
than a group of less recency-weighting agents. In the next phase, this will
be the case with e2, and so on. Hence, as stated in Sec. 2.2, a can be used
as a controlable parameter that affects macro dynamics, and conversely, we
can calibrate a from the data of an observed meso or macro scale dynamic.
Similar phenomena can be observed in multi-agent simulation. Fig. 3
(a) shows a typical result of the simulation with multi-agent Monte Carlo
learning for a

= 0.5, and Fig. 3 (b) for a = 0.1 . The trajectories are not such

neat lines as numerical solutions because decision-making is made by each of
autonomous agents, and the frequency vector only reflects the consequences
of bottom-up processes. However, its pattern of convergence to bdr t and
periods of cycles resemble those of the discrete replicator dynamics. Notice
that Fig. 2 (a) and (b) are analogous to Fig. 3 (a) and (b), respectively.
This, again, evidences the relationship between parameter

e and the agents'

degree of recency-weighting a, the proposition of which is found in Theorem
2. Additionally, (26) and Theorem 2 imply that an extremely small value of

a generates periodic cycles, almost like the continuous replicator dynamics.
This is also evidenced by a result of the simulation with multi-agent Monte
Carlo learning for a

= 0.00001, shown in Fig. 3 (c). Notice that Fig. 3 (c)

is analogous to Fig. 1 in its appearance 7 , rather than Fig. 2. Hence, the
7

For the convenience to restrict our concern to the deterministic evolutionary

game, it is stated so. However, if the topic were extended to include stochastic
evolutionary games, this result would need to be associated with the stochastic
dynamics presented by Foster and Young (1990) .
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distributed Monte Carlo learning model can be related not only with the
discrete replicator equation (8) , but also with the continuous version (5).

5 Conclusions and discussions

A tight relationship between the multi-agent simulation with Monte Carlo
learning and the prototype evolutionary game theory with replicator equations was proved and experimentally evidenced. This not only shows the
similarity of the dynamics in these two models. It also formalizes the process
by which micro behaviors of autonomous agents translate to the aggregate
dynamics of a society at large (ie. fluctuation pattern in macro dynamics
was derived from micro factors of recency-weighting.). This result provides
a basis for prospective theories bridging micro and macro dynamics models.
Moreover, it demonstrates that the experimental results of simulations with
distributed intelligence can be backed up by theories to a reasonable extent.
An additional contribution of the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 is to

e in (8). The relationship between the ABMs and the replicator model has added an interpretation of e
illustrate the intuitively mysterious constant

as being associated with the degree of agents' recency-weighting. This suggests the possibility that the seemingly chaotic behaviors of ABMs may be
explained by theoretical models with varying degrees of recency weighting.
The consequence of this paper poses an interesting question. The ABMs'
side of the evolution is considered active, since learning based on expected
payoff optimization is the result of intentional computation. On the other
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hand, the nature of prototype evolutionary game is considered to be passive
at the micro level, due to the premise made by most biologists and ecologists
that natural selection drives evolution that relies mostly on chance. If the
results presented in this paper are valid (ie. the definition and assumptions
made in Sec. 3 are appropriate), then this implies that active behaviors of
economic agents and passive being (such as genes) give rise to the equivalent dynamics. At this point, there is no sufficient logic with this to affect
the recent disputes on the validity of biological metaphors in evolutionary
economics. As far as economics is concerned, we could argue that the dominance of evolutionary process might vanish the macro effects of agent-wise
activeness . In this case, the question arises "how big of a role does micro
activeness play in determining the macro dynamics?" This clearly depends
on the complexity of agent interactions, or the network structure. We have
analyzed the effects of a micro factor, a, on macro dynamics. However, this
is far from all.

As mentioned previously, Monte Carlo learning is one of the most fundamental algorithms to decide the process of agent learning. For example,
Sutton and Barto (1998) extended Monte Carlo learning to develop major
reinforcement learning algorithms, such as Q-Iearning and Sarsa. With computational reinforcement learning, an agent can learn the future-cumulative
payoff of a strategy by bootstrapping the expected values of those states
that the strategy he chose will stochastically lead to. With this property
of reinforcement learning, agents will cope more effectively with repeated
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games than Monte Carlo agents can. Interestingly, a slight modification to
equation (12) with a flavor of the Bellman equation or dynamic programming (Bellman, 1957) will realize some reinforcement learning algorithms.
Thus, the aggregate reinforcement learning will be easily defined with some
forms similar to (15). Our study leaves open extensions to these and many
other learning algorithms. It is expected that a series of such works on complex systems will help bridge the computational and theoretical fields , and
as well as micro and macro dynamics models.

Appendix A: The Algorithm of Agent-Based Monte Carlo Learning

A simplified pseudocode for the agent-based Monte Carlo learning is presented below. The characters and symbols used here are consistent with
those in the text.
A .1. Model program
repeat until program terminates
for each strategy i do

end do
for each agent do
i

f-

Xi

agent:chooseStrategy( {xi-I, X~-l,

f-

Xi

+ 1.0 /

totalNumberOfAgents

...

,X~-l} )
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end do
for each strategy i do
ei Ax +---

L:j

aij

x

Xj

end do
for each agent do
agent.·learn( {e1Ax, e2Ax, ... ,enAx} )

end do
end repeat

A.2. Strategy choice by an agent
agent:chooseStrategy( state)

1 +--- categorize( state)
bestPayoff +---

-(X)

for each strategy i do
if Vil > bestPayoff then
bestPayoff +--strategy

end if
end do
return strategy
end
A.3. Learning by an agent

agent:learn(payoffSet)

for each strategy i do

+---

i

Vil

32

Evolutionary games and distributed Monte Carlo learning

if i

=

strategy then

end if
end do
end

Appendix B: Path-Dependence Consideration on the Relationship
between

e and ex

Since Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 hold, we treat

e, q/, and 'lj;t as identical

parameters. Let us take (pt as representative, and consider it as a function
of

0:'.

Before analyzing the sensitivity of q/ to

0:',

we need to take a look at

that of vf. From (13), we derive

-

[ t - l .A
Xi
et

+ (1 -

x t-l -

-t - l j
Vi

t-2
0:' ) [Xi
ei A

xt -

2

-t-2j
- Vi

+ (1 -

a- t - 2

0:'

)2 a;;Vi

t

''""''""'' "(1
D

0:'

)k [ t - k - l
Xi

e t.Ax t-k-l

_ -t-k - l j
Vi

.

k=O

Intuitively, this value represents the recency-weighted cumulative errors of
aggregate estimates, or aggregate reminiscence of past errors. Here, the
errors are in terms of the degree of underestimates. Let ARP Ef (standing
for Aggregate Reminiscence of Past Errors) denote the value of avfj aO:'.
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ARP E is truely chaotic and path-dependent unless a = 1 - or the dynamics
is at least locally stable.
Now let us turn to the sensitivity of

We know lima~l dq/ Ida

q}

to a. From (16), we derive

= O. Thus, it is necessary that d2 (pt Ida 2 < 0 for

the domain of a to have the inverse relationship with

e. However , d q/ I da
2

2

depends more sophisticatedly on the path-dependent terms of ARPE's.
Hence, we simply make a weak argument as presented in Theorem 2. Fortunately, we may find many cases where ARP E; eventually vanishes , such
as the dynamics with exponential stability, oscillatory stability, and exponential unstability due to the boundedness of

rn

(major counter-examples

are oscillatory unstability and limit cycles). In such cases, Theorem 2 will
be stronger.
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Abstract

This paper presents a tight relationship between evolutionary

game theory and distributed intelligence models. After reviewing some existing theories of replicator dynamics and distributed Monte Carlo learning, we
make formulations and proofs of the equivalence between these two models.
The relationship will be revealed not only from a theoretical viewpoint, but
also by experimental simulations of the models by taking a simple symmetric zero-sum game ap an example. As a consequence, it will be verified that
seemingly chaotic macro dynamics generated by distributed micro-decisions
can be explained with theoretical models.
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1 Introduction: significance of the topic

Evolutionary game theory and computational economics! are two of the
latest fields to account for evolutionary processes of economics. When it
comes to a problem of aggregate behavior, the former seems to have a
limited ability to incorporate micro behaviors of each economic agent, while
the latter often fails in formalizing the processes. Indeed, computational
simulation practitioners empirically know that a collection of rule-based or
learnable autonomous agents usually leads to an emergent outcome that
partially agrees with the theoretically expected one , but the process by
which distributed intelligence translates to such an outcome has been seldom
understood (the difficulty of rigorous analyses is stated by Maes (1995)).
However , the field also exhibits flexibilities which can be associated with
existing theories of dynamics.
In this paper, we present the equivalence between the prototype theory of deterministic evolutionary games and the computational model of
1

Computational economics varies in its sub-fields. For example, there are (i) nu-

merical dynamics, (ii) numerical optimization (iii) heuristic optimization, and (iv)
bottom-up processes by autonomous entities, etc. In this paper, we will narrowsightedly refer to only (iv) as "computational economics."
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distributed-agent Monte Carlo learning. Monte Carlo learning was selected
mainly for two reasons. First, it lays a foundation for many of the other
learning algorithms , especially Q-learning and Sarsa algorithms (Barto and
Singh, 1990; Sutton and Barto, 1998). Second, unlike evolutionary algorithms , its simple form makes it easier to extend the algorithm to be associated with economic theory. Before discussing the main ideas, let us identify
the relative roles and the historical background of evolutionary game theory,
computational distributed-agent models, and learning.
Several methodologies have been developed to explain aggregate behaviors of multiple economic agents where strategic decision-making is involved.
Normal-form theoretical models have played a basic role. While bearing out
the theory of games von Neumann devoted himself to the development of
self-reproductive machines and cellular automata (von Neumann, 1966) ,
that later was to produce what is called artificial life or ALife (Langton,
1989). Artificial life has in turn motivated computer-based experimental
scientists to model games of complex systems that generate emergent dynamics. However , few researchers have made attempts to merge these two
distant fields of von Neumann's legacy

2.

While some economists were acquiring a new model of games which
stem from the initial developments by Maynard Smith (1974), biologists had
2

Some early 1990s' pioneering works (eg. Holland and Miller (1991) ; Arthur

(1993)) have attempted to merge economic theory and autonomous intelligence
models. Judd (1997) and Judd (2001) discuss the potential roles of computational
economics in emerging economic theory.
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started to employ computational and individual-based models (IBMs) to examine bottom-up behaviors of ecological dynamics (eg. Dewdney, 1984). Today, the contributions of IBMs are not restricted to applied problems, but include theoretical problems in population and community ecology (Haefner,
1996). On the other hand, the theoretical dynamics model of deterministic evolutionary games, or replicator dynamics (Taylor and Johnker, 1978;
Schuster and Sigmund, 1983)3, was shown by Hofbauer (1981) to be equivalent to an ecological dynamics model, namely the Lotka-Volterra equation.
This sequence of events suggests the possibility of merging IBMs into the
formulations of deterministic evolutionary games .
While the deterministic evolutionary games were becoming obsolete for
game theorists, they certainly absorbed economists in the 1990s (Friedman
(1991); and for stochastic version later by Kandori et al et al (1993)) . Unlike
the passive being of chromosomes in biological systems, economic agents exhibit active characteristics (ie. learning). It was therefore a natural course
for economists to turn their attention to this dynamic aspect (eg. Roth
and Erev, 1995; Dosi, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine,
1998, etc.). Computational experiments as well as psychological laboratory
experiments complement theory in this aspect . One way to demonstrate
how to use computational experiments in learning is to employ agent-based
3

Extensions and analyses of the replicator dynamics, multi-agent dynamics,

and other derivatives were made by Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988; 1998; 2003),
Cressman (1992), Samuelson and Zhang (1992), Swinkels (1993), Weibull (1997),
etc.
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simulations or agent-based models (ABMs; also called agent-based computational economics or ACE), a sub-field of computational economics (for an
overview, see Tesfatsion, 2002) .
ABMs in economics are the analogues of IBMs in biology. In ABMs,
some other forms of learnable functions (eg. Monte Carlo sampling, statistical learning, reinforcement learning, neural networks, evolutionary algorithms, etc.) are embedded in each economic agent, and the agents behave
autonomously by querying their internal function for the optimal actions
or strategies given the current state of the world. Hence, ABMs conduct
the process of strategy optimization at a micro level. ABMs are usually
employed to explain the sophisticated bottom-up processes of evolutionary economics, which would be infeasible with top-down theoretical models
(Tesfatsion, 2000) . While it appears that the principles of ABMs researchers
and those of game theorists have diverged more than converged, the concept
of the replicator dynamics roughly agrees with simple learnable ABMs, as
will be shown in later sections.
In this paper we begin by briefly reviewing the basis of existing theories of deterministic evolutionary games and the algorithm of distributed
Monte Carlo learning (Sec. 2). Then, our discussion moves on to formulations and proofs of the equivalence of evolutionary game theory and multiagent Monte Carlo learning (Sec . 3). Our method does not rely on the field's
convention of using the hypothetico-deductive approach, but will instead
start with the somewhat farfetched connection of the two models' formu-
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lations. In Sec. 4, experimental results of ABMs will be compared to the
theoretical dynamics model to graphically verify their common behavioral
patterns. The end product is the theoretical and experimental verifications
of the relationship between these two models. This will also enable some
explanations about how micro behaviors translate to macro dynamics.

2 Background of theory and algorithm

We begin with some definitions and a description of the tools to be used for
the succeeding analyses . Assume that the number of participating agents in
the game world is finite and fixed. Assume also that the number of strategies
or actions that these agents can take is finite and fixed. Let n denote the total
number of available strategies, and let

Xi

denote the relative frequency of

agents that take strategy i, such that L:~=o Xi
(Xl, X2,"',

= 1, Xi 2: OVi. Note that x =

xn) represents the distribution vector 4 of strategy frequencies,

whereas x in a normal-form game would represent the distribution vector
of strategy probabilities. Let
{x

ER+ I L:~=l

Xi

rn

denote the subset of

R+ defined as rn =

= 1, x 2: o} . Point x can move only on rn, the strategy

space. The aggregate pure states are represented by the vertices of r

n

,

and

the aggregate mixed states by all the points off the vertices. The core rule
of the game is determined by a payoff matrix An x n

=

(aij), where aij or,

eiAej, is the payoff for taking pure strategy i when all the agents in the
4

The vector notation used throughout this paper ignores the row/column dis-

tinctions. Thus, xAx means x TAx.

